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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3116 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BRUCE A. RODRIGUEZ, 
        Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 08-cr-00559-001 
(Honorable James Knoll Gardner) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 2, 2012) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Bruce Rodriguez appeals this 72 month sentence following a guilty plea to one 
count of distribution of cocaine, and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance 
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of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). We will enforce Rodriguez‟s waiver of 
his right to appeal and affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
On February 7, 2008, Rodriguez sold 28 grams of cocaine to an undercover police 
detective and a cooperating informant in Reading, Pennsylvania. Officers arrested 
Rodriguez and searched his home, where they located two handguns, ammunition for the 
guns, a stun gun, assorted drug paraphernalia, 67 grams of cocaine, and $28,773 in cash, 
including some of the bills used in the drug transaction.   
Rodriguez signed a written guilty plea agreement and agreed to cooperate with the 
government. In return, the government agreed to file a motion for a departure from the 
Sentencing Guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and for imposition of a sentence below 
any mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C § 3553(e) if it 
determined, in its sole discretion, Rodriguez had provided “complete and substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense.”  
The plea agreement also contained a waiver of Rodriguez‟s right to appeal. 
Paragraph 9 reads:  
In exchange for the undertakings made by the government in entering this 
plea agreement, the defendant voluntarily and expressly waives all rights to 
appeal or collaterally attack the defendant‟s conviction, sentence, or any 
other matter relating to this prosecution, whether such right to appeal or 
collateral attack arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, or any other provision of law.  This waiver is not intended 
to bar the assertion of constitutional claims that the relevant case law holds 
cannot be waived. 
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a. Notwithstanding the waiver provision above, if the government 
appeals from the sentence, then the defendant may file a direct 
appeal of his sentence. 
b. If the government does not appeal, then notwithstanding the waiver 
provision set forth in this paragraph, the defendant may file a direct 
appeal but may raise only claims that: 
(1) the defendant‟s sentence on any count of conviction exceeds 
the statutory maximum for that count as set forth in paragraph 
6 above; 
(2) the sentencing judge erroneously departed upward pursuant to 
the Sentencing Guidelines; 
(3) the sentencing judge, exercising the Court‟s discretion 
pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), 
imposed an unreasonable sentence above the final Sentencing 
Guideline range determined by the Court; and/or 
If the defendant does appeal pursuant to this paragraph, no issue may be 
presented by the defendant on appeal other than those described in this 
paragraph. 
 
The District Court conducted a Rule 11 colloquy during the change of plea 
hearing. Rodriguez testified he signed the guilty plea agreement, his counsel had fully 
explained the charges against him, and he understood his right to trial. The prosecution 
summarized the plea agreement in full, and Rodriguez told the court he understood it. 
The court offered a lengthy explanation of the rights of appeal ordinarily enjoyed by 
criminal defendants. Rodriguez affirmed that he understood those rights and knew that by 
signing the waiver, he abandoned them with limited and specific exceptions. The court 
emphasized to Rodriguez the government would only file a departure motion if satisfied 
with his cooperation. Furthermore, without a departure motion, the court could not 
impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence requirements. The court 
concluded Rodriguez was competent and his waiver of the right to appeal was knowing 
and voluntary. 
4 
 
Following his guilty plea, the government determined Rodriguez‟s cooperation 
was insufficient. The government had told Rodriguez, before he signed the plea 
agreement, it was only interested in information about persons trafficking quantities of 
narcotics greater than or equal to those dealt by Rodriguez. After signing the plea 
agreement, Rodriguez provided the government information about seven people, four of 
whom he had engaged in drug deals with. Rodriguez alleged the remaining three were 
narcotics dealers, but he had no direct knowledge of their activities. Rodriguez also told 
the authorities his narcotics supplier would cooperate with the government on 
Rodriguez‟s behalf. That supplier met once with the government and, although he 
promised to cooperate, the supplier failed to attend any additional meetings and was not 
heard from again.  It is undisputed the government initiated no investigations based on 
information provided by Rodriguez. 
When the government informed Rodriguez it did not intend to submit a downward 
motion on his behalf, he filed a motion to compel the government to do so. Both parties 
offered testimony at a hearing. There was no factual dispute between the parties 
concerning the nature of Rodriguez‟s cooperation and the content of the information he 
provided. The District Court denied Rodriguez‟s motion to compel because the 
government, exercising its sole discretion under the plea agreement, determined his 
cooperation was unsatisfactory. The cooperation led to no investigations, and none of the 
information provided by Rodriguez pertained to targets sought by the government. 
Accordingly, the court found Rodriguez had not “met his burden of demonstrating that 
the government‟s decision was based on anything other than an honest evaluation of 
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assistance.” The court sentenced Rodriguez to 72 months‟ imprisonment, the low end of 
the Guidelines range, and monetary penalties of $3300. Rodriguez filed a timely notice of 
appeal.
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II. 
 Criminal defendants may waive constitutional and statutory rights in plea 
agreements as long as the waiver is voluntary and with knowledge of the nature and 
consequences of the waiver. United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). We have enforced waivers 
of appeals “if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, unless they work a miscarriage of 
justice.” United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 558 (3d Cir. 2001). We will review the 
merits of an appeal despite an appellate waiver if the appeal implicates an exception 
listed in the plea agreement. United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008). 
The appellate waiver is entered into knowingly where the terms of the agreement 
are explained to the defendant and the defendant signed the agreement, acknowledging he 
understood the terms. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 238-39. To enter into the agreement 
voluntarily, the defendant must not be coerced or misled into signing the agreement. Id. 
at 239.  
Here, the government points to Rodriguez‟s signature on the plea agreement and 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a 
defendant‟s waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement). Our review of the validity 
and applicability of the appellate waiver in Rodriguez‟s plea agreement is de novo.  
United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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the Rule 11 colloquy at the change of plea hearing to indicate Rodriguez‟s waiver was 
knowing and voluntary. Rodriguez does not dispute this, and the record indicates 
Rodriguez‟s waiver was knowing and voluntary. Rodriguez testified he had signed the 
agreement. The prosecution summarized the plea agreement orally, and Rodriguez 
confirmed he understood it. The District Court explained to Rodriguez in detail the 
different grounds for appeal available to him absent a waiver. The court then explained 
the effect his waiver would have on his right to appeal, and Rodriguez told the court he 
understood. There was nothing to suggest a lack of knowledge or volition. 
 Enforcing Rodriguez‟s appellate waiver does not give rise to a miscarriage of 
justice. In Khattak, we recognized “[t]here may be an unusual circumstance where an 
error amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.” Khattak, 273 F.3d 
at 562. Although we declined to delineate specific circumstances, we identified certain 
factors to determine whether enforcing the waiver creates a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 
563. Those factors include:  
[T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns 
a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of 
the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the 
government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)). In United States v. 
Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005), we elaborated that the miscarriage of justice 
exception “„will be applied sparingly and without undue generosity.‟” Id. (quoting Teeter, 
257 F.3d at 26). A miscarriage of justice is not created merely because the appellate 
waiver bars a meritorious claim. See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561-62.  
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Rodriguez presents no persuasive argument that enforcing the waiver would create 
a miscarriage of justice. There is no evidence he signed the plea agreement as a result of 
coercion. The District Court sought and received assurances from Rodriguez that he had 
not been coerced or misled into signing the plea agreement through oral promises. 
Moreover, the gravity and the impact of the alleged error below are insignificant. The 
District Court stated even if it compelled the government to file a motion for downward 
departure, it would not grant the motion because it found Rodriguez‟s cooperation 
insufficient.  
Nor does Rodriguez‟s appeal implicate any of the exceptions to the appellate 
waiver. The plea agreement allows Rodriguez to appeal the following: (1) a government 
appeal; (2) a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum; or (3) an erroneous upward 
departure from the otherwise applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. None of those 
circumstances is present here. The government has not appealed, and the sentence was 
below the statutory maximum and within the sentencing guidelines range. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will enforce the appellate waiver in the plea 
agreement, and affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
